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## The military roots of American intelligence as an organization

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### Abstract

The concept of intelligence, as an organization, not only most likely predates the extant written and archeological record but has clear, crystallization, dating to antiquity, across multiple historical traditions, in regards to both. Invariably and irrespective of historical tradition, the ensconcing context was either one of state security or the not necessarily mutually exclusive context of military operations. The concept of a military context accurately encapsulates the formative history of intelligence, as an organization, in regards to the United States. The subject study is intended to serve a proper historical context to a series of works that detail both the history of efforts, within the Central Intelligence Agency and its predecessor agency, along with the lexicosemantic product resulting from such efforts, based upon an evaluation of declassified documents, in regards to the task of defining the term intelligence.

**Keywords:** Intelligence, military intelligence, American history

### Introduction

One may readily adopt the terms signifier and signified, from the translated works of de Saussure (2011, 65-67)<sup>[1]</sup>, as being referential to any bound or unbound morpheme for the former and the meaning ascribed for the latter. In that there is no evidence for any underlying process of objectivistic<sup>[1]</sup> actuality that provides for a linkage between a signifier and the signified, one may also readily accept the notion that such a linkage is arbitrary beyond the simple precepts of historical usage and commonality of usage. One may readily make such adoptions without accepting such fanciful notions as language being 'almost like a dictionary of which identical copies have been distributed to each individual (de Saussure, 2011, 19)<sup>[1]</sup>' or the nontheistic religious ascription of the encoding of stated or unstated power relations, as per the claim, consistent with a myopic weltanschauung leading to projection and imputation, of those subject to and accepting of the indoctrination found within the grievance studies of Western academia<sup>[2]</sup>. Predicated upon such adoptions, one may state that differences in usage can result in a non-injective mapping<sup>[3]</sup> between any given signifier and multiple significations and with the relationship between the significations being either polysemous or homonymous. The ambiguity that arises from such a mapping may be acceptable, depending upon context, inclusive of both the lexicosemantic context of the communication as well as the individual (s) that are involved in the communicative process. Situations in which precision, rather than ambiguity in regards to the aforementioned mapping, is apt, invariably involve the necessity for developing precisifying definitions. An example of such a situation is that of legal systems that at least nominally are predicated upon a codified system of laws rather than solely the whim of a trier of fact. One individual terminating the organized existence of another individual may be characterized as murder by any number of individuals utilizing their own definitions of the term. For a jurisdiction in which a codified system of laws is viewed as being determinative and within which the term murder is defined, it is such a precisifying definition that takes precedent over any common usage of the term (to the extent that the latter differ from the former). Another context in which precision, rather than ambiguity, can be viewed as being positive is in an organizational context. A common understanding of the relationship between signifiers and the signified aids in the communicative

process of individuals within any given organization, reduces the propensity for duplication of effort (not everyone gets to be the CEO) and enhances the propensity for efficiency. When it comes to the term 'intelligence' there is clearly a mapping of one term to multiple meanings (in regards to a relatively recent period of temporality). One such meaning, applied to the individual, generally involves a capacity for acquiring data, developing knowledge and using such knowledge. Dr. Sherman Kent, often referred to as 'the father of intelligence analysis,' in the 1948 preface to his seminal text, while noting that his reference to the term in question was not that which 'psychologists try to measure in a given human mind,' but rather was 'the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare (Kent, 1965, xxi) <sup>[21]</sup>.' That these two usages may not be mutually exclusive does not mitigate the subject author's interpretation that a usage of the term in question is that of intelligence as knowledge. Such an interpretation is consistent with the first of the tripartite divisions in Kent's work (i.e. intelligence as knowledge) and with other divisions being intelligence as an organization and intelligence as an activity. Kent's articulated classification, in the view of the subject author, is an example of polysemous usage. If one considers the constituents of each usage, limited by the temporal specificity of instantiation and irrespective of the signifiers used by those of the time, one may posit the view that each usage was apt to a temporal extent that most likely predates the extent archeological and historical record. Translations of cuneiform inscriptions, found on clay tablets excavated from the ruins of the Amorite city of Mari, dating to the 18th century BCE and the reign of Zimri-Lim, make reference to (using the terminology of the translators and the cited source) a state level apparatus for the recruitment of engagement of agents for espionage, concerns over counterespionage, the existence of an (intelligence) bureau for the collection, evaluation and filing of information and the use of a tablet classification system (Sheldon, 1989) <sup>[33]</sup>. In the translation of the works of Sun Tzu, the original dating to approximately the 5th century BCE, it is noted that wise sovereigns and good generals conquer and achieve beyond the ken of ordinary men due to 'foreknowledge,' which is not to be obtained by soliciting spirits, obtained inductively from experience or deductively from calculation, but rather 'knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men,' hence the use of spies (Tzu, ca. 5th century BCE/2000, 59-62) <sup>[4, 37]</sup>.

In the Indic tradition, one can find references to espionage in both major Smriti texts (the Mahabharata and Ramayana) as well as in the Rig-Veda (dating to between the 16th and 13th centuries BCE but with an antecedent transmission via oral tradition) (Niruthan, 2019) <sup>[28]</sup>. The Arthashastra, most likely written in the 2nd or 3rd century CE contains a full chapter on covert operations and describes an organized hierarchy for both domestic and foreign operations (Kautilya, 2nd or 3rd century CE/1992, 498-507) <sup>[22]</sup>. The Manusmriti, written anywhere between the 1st century and 3rd century CE, also contains substantive information on the use of spies, which can be encapsulated, 'by means of spies, by a display of strength and by engaging in enterprises, he (the King) should identify his own and his enemy's relative strength and ascertain the relative gravity of all the adversities and evils affecting his enemy and himself; and

only then should he embark on any operation (Olivelle, 2005, 205) <sup>[29]</sup>.' One can readily find reporting on the use of spies in military contexts and otherwise, spanning both time and geography, in regards to ancient Egypt, the Persian Achaemenid empire, ancient Greece and ancient Rome (Crowdy, 2008) <sup>[10]</sup>. From the totality of these instantiations, it would appear to be safe to draw the conclusion that espionage, as a function of state, conducted by human agents, in contexts military and otherwise, represents a historical and normative form of intelligence practice. It should also be noted that the practice of intelligence, exemplified by the antecedent historical examples, included an instantiated hierarchy (barring the case of the battle commander or ruler serving as a spy) as well as contextualization of information.

These cases, dating to antiquity and across multiple historical traditions, aid in providing a transition to the near context of the subject work. The subject work is a derivative of an in progress research project, by the subject author, that involves analyzing the temporal lexicosemantic changes in the term 'intelligence,' as it relates to both content and process, within the American context. It was this exterior context that served as a basis for the inclusion of the content, as well as form, of the first two paragraphs of the subject Introduction. The concept of defining the term 'intelligence,' is not novel as readily attested to by the temporal range of published works present in the literature (Warner, 2002; Diaz, 2011; Breakspear, 2013; Wheaton and Beerbower, 2018; Macpherson and Hastedt, 2023) <sup>[5, 12, 24, 53, 55]</sup>. Missing from these works is consideration of the substantial work product generated by the salient individuals at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), its immediate organizational predecessor, and from various Executive branch departments (working in conjunction) in regards to task of defining intelligence terminology. In the original instantiation, the progenitor of this work consisted of the presentation and evaluation of the totality of the declassified corpus. Such a presentation was far too lengthy, aided by the subject author's tendency for verbosity, deriving out of a desire for accuracy, for publication as a single paper. While the totality of the temporal activity could readily be divided into multiyear periods of activity, the presentation of the documents in their historical, in conjunction with the lexicosemantic evaluation, was deemed, by the author, to still be exceedingly extensive (on a per period basis). Thusly, the decision was made to divide the broader study into separate, smaller, studies.

In drafting the study for the historical developments during the first period of activity, that been between 1946-1948, which covered the historical development of the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), representing a paradigm change in intelligence as an organization within the American central government context, followed by the replacement of the CIG by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), one was left with addressing the antecedent history of intelligence as an organization within the American central government context to an extent that a foundational historical review of this context was deemed apt.

Thusly, it can be aptly stated that the goal of the subject work is the presentation of the history of intelligence, as an organization, in the American context. This context, as shown in the body of this work, was a military context. Depending upon personal context, a question that one might

have is why the focus on the American context. Using a date of inception of 4 July, 1776 (the date of signing of the Declaration of Independence) <sup>[5]</sup> and setting aside the fact that the success of the Colonial insurrection <sup>[6]</sup> against British rule was by no means guaranteed (i.e. independence was contested) one arrives at a duration of existence, with respect to the time of the drafting of the subject work, of approximately 248 years. This represents a mere fraction, approximately 2.8%, of the temporal period over which human civilization has existed <sup>[7]</sup>. This brief duration of existence, however, belies the fact that the impact of intelligence, as an organization within the US, has a scope of operations and impact, both global, unparalleled in human history. Starting with the establishment of a Naval Office of Intelligence on 23 March, 1882 (Naval History and Heritage Command, 2014), the US Intelligence Community (USIC), a term coined by within a 1955 report of a task force led by General Mark Clark (United States Department of State, 2007, 667) has metastasized to currently consisting of 18 constituent agencies.

### Methodology

The presentation approach undertaken in the subject work is of following the chronological order of development of intelligence, as an organization, in the American experience. That this development occurred within a military context was already noted above. The temporal period of consideration has boundary points of the Colonial insurrection and the establishment of the CIG. The goal of the author in regards to the subject presentation was not to provide a complete recitation of the historical record. For each facet of the record, one can readily find multiple book length publications that detail the facet to an exquisite level of detail. Instead, the approach taken herein was to establish a foundation for the subsequent presentation of the first period of lexicosemantic endeavor that involved the salient individuals at the CIG as well as others from various Executive branch departments of the US central government.

### The military roots of US intelligence

The contextual application of intelligence during the first century (approximately) of the existence of the US as a country can be summarized as follows: 'Prior to the 1880s, intelligence activities were devoted almost exclusively to support of military operations, either to support deployed forces or to obtain information on the views or participation of other countries in a particular conflict (Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community [Aspin-Brown Commission], 1996) <sup>[8]</sup>.' This statement is consistent with intelligence as both an organization and as an activity that is synonymous with surveillance, reconnaissance and espionage. Such a description is apt when considering George Washington, during the colonial insurrection, as the 'spymaster' of the Culpepper Ring (Lengel, 2008) <sup>[23]</sup>. Both the Continental Army and Navy were disbanded near the terminus of the successful insurrection. The US Army was developed from the disbanded Continental Army and the subsequent founding of volunteer militia based First American Regiment. The United States Navy was founded in 1794 with the passage of the Act to Provide a Naval Armament. While being disjoint at the levels of planning and operations, both organizations performed in a cohesive

manner during the War of 1812 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d.). On the military intelligence side, the War of 1812 involved a dramatic failure in terms of both decision making and military intelligence, which led to the capture of Washington, DC, by British forces under the command of Rear Admiral George Cockburn (Weber, 2014).

The lack of joint planning and operations between the United States Army and Navy did not hinder the success of either during the American Civil War (1861-1865) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, n. d.). Intelligence services played a key role for both the Union and the Confederacy (Aspin-Brown Commission, 1996; Coddington, 2019, 39-57) <sup>[6, 8]</sup>. For the military, generally, and military intelligence specifically, the successful outcome in the Civil War was followed by a period of decay, until the next conflict. As an example, the Bureau of Military Intelligence, created by Union General George Hooker, disbanded at the terminus of the war, served as a formative predecessor for the 1865 creation of the Secret Service Division of the Department of Treasury (with an ostensible role of fighting currency counterfeiting). This cyclical rise and fall pattern would be evidenced multiple times over the next few decades.

The historical developments between the end of the American Civil War and the terminus of the First World War are of particular import to the organization of the military intelligence endeavor in the US. In this regard, as it relates to the US Army, foreign militaries, particularly those in Western Europe, at the time, played a critical role. An 1871 meeting between Secretary of State William Seward and Major General Emory Upton, in which the latter agreed to the former's suggestion of visiting China (Michie, 1885, 284-285) <sup>[25]</sup>, turned into a grand tour through Europe and Asia. Secretary of War, William Belknap, in his 23 June, 1875 letter to Upton, in which he approved Upton's request for the trip, indicated that the 'professional object' of the trip was for Upton to 'examine and report upon the organization, tactics and the manoeuvres of the armies along the route mentioned,' with particular importance being placed upon Germany (the reference being to Prussia) and 'the collection and compilation of such other information as might naturally be expected to be of utility to this Government (Upton, 1878, iii-iv).' The structure and function of the Prussian military was of particular interest to both Belknap and to General William Tecumseh Sherman, who himself had undertaken a trip to Europe, in 1871, in an unofficial capacity (Bidwell, 1986, 44) <sup>[3]</sup>. In 1857, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder was appointed as the Chief of the Prussian General Staff and within three years had pushed through a series of reforms. The impact of these reforms was clearly evidenced in the resounding success of the Prussian forces, against the French military, during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The study of the Prussian forces, including but not limited to, the professionalization of military training and education as well as organizational structure, played heavily in the conclusions reached by Upton (1878, 317-370). In 1880, General Sherman issued a general order in which it was indicated that all officers visiting foreign countries were to obtain information of military value to the US government (United States Adjutant General's Office, 1881).

As noted previously, on 23 March, 1882, the naval Office of Intelligence, within the Bureau of Navigation, was established. The story of the establishment of the first bureau level military intelligence organization proceeds as

following. In 1885, the Secretary of War suggested to the Adjutant General, Brigadier General Richard C. Drum, that ‘... it would be well if a bureau be set up by the Adjutant General for the purpose of collecting and filing information concerning foreign governments which would be of interest to the government of the United States,’ after the latter indicated that he had no information in regards to a foreign power about which the former had requested information (Van Deman, 1950, 6) <sup>[49]</sup>. Subsequently, and in the same year, the Adjutant General directed Major William J. Volkmar, who was the head of the Military Reservations Division of the Miscellaneous Branch, within the Office of Adjutant General (Bethel, 1947) <sup>[2]</sup> and who himself had traveled to France to study French cavalry maneuvers (Volkmar, 1884) <sup>[50]</sup>, to organize a Division of Military Information, which was to be tasked with gathering ‘military items from all available sources (Bidwell, 1986, 52) <sup>[31]</sup>.’ A request for military information was sent to the bureau and department leaders of the Department of War in 1886 and in 1887 a similar request was sent to various northern frontier commanding officers (Simpson, 1902) <sup>[34]</sup>. In 1888, individuals within the Department of War successfully lobbied the US Congress to include funding for a “clerk attendant on the collection and classification of military information from abroad (United States Congress, 1888, p. 483)” as part of the Army funding within the Appropriation Act of September 22, 1888 (25 Stat. 481). The War Department leadership used this as a basis to create a regular military attaché system the following year (United States National Archives, 1987, 1). The same year (1889), the Division of Military Information was brought to division status, under the direct supervision of the Adjutant General. The problems associated with a lack of joint planning and operations between the US Army and Navy came to the fore, in 1898, during the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War. These issues, however, were not sufficient to impact the outcome of the relatively short duration of conflict, nor were they determinative in the outcome of the US government acquiring control, from Spain, of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. The issues of military organization and training, with the former not having been determinative in the outcome of the Spanish-American War, were driving factors in the years following the war. The postmortem evaluation on the performance of the US Army focused on the Secretary of War, Russell Alger (White, 1998) <sup>[56]</sup>. The Dodge Commission Report exonerated Alger in regards to the issues of corruption and neglect but not so on the issue of management and furthermore strongly suggested the need for reorganizing the US Army (Ranson, 1971) <sup>[31]</sup>. Alger was forced to resign by President McKinley and replaced by Elihu Root. On 19 February, 1900, by special order, Root directed the investigation into the establishment of a War College for the US Army (United States Department of War, 1912, 3) <sup>[42]</sup>. War Department General Order No. 155, issued on 27 November, 1901, established a formal system for officer training and with the Army War College serving as the pinnacle (Parameters Editors, 2001) <sup>[30]</sup>. The order also established the War College Board, whose appointment was detailed in 1902 by War Department General Order No. 64 (United States Department of War, 1912, 4) <sup>[42]</sup>, served a dual role in terms of military education and general staff function (Semsch, 1963) <sup>[32]</sup>. On the legislative front, Root’s lobbying efforts bore fruit with the passage of the 1903 act

to increase the efficiency of the Army, which provided for the establishment of the General Staff Corps (United States Congress, 1903, 830-831) <sup>[40]</sup>. The War College Board was dissolved, shortly thereafter, by General Order No. 2 and its duties were transferred to the War General Staff. The restructuring of the Army resulted in the transfer of the Division of Military Information, from the Office of the Adjutant General, to the Second Division of the General Staff (Bigelow, 2012) <sup>[4]</sup>. In the same year (1903), an initial attempt was made to address the issue of a lack of joint planning and operations between the US Army and US Navy, with the formation of a Joint Board; the board, having only advisory powers, was not successful (Joint Chiefs of Staff, n. d.). At the bureau level, the US Army intelligence effort became moribund and effectively nonfunctional with the 1908 merging of the Second Division with the General Staff’s Third Division. This merger resulted in information duties being handled by a Military Information Committee, the members of which had multiple other duties, and with the resultant being production being only for the Third Division followed by ceasing of all production (Finnegan, 1998, 16) <sup>[16]</sup>.

The 28 June, 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, triggered a series of treaty based alliances that in turn resulted in the onset of the First World War (28 July, 1914). The claim that the Wilson administration was a neutral party in the conflict, until the US Congressional 6 April, 1917 declaration of war (made at the request of President Wilson on 2 April, 1917) is both dubious and falsifiable. Unfortunately, such a topic is beyond the scope of the subject work. Shortly after the onset of the First World War, Major Ralph Van Deman, who would come to be known as the father of American military intelligence, was transferred to the Military Information Division to the War College Division of the General Staff Corps. Upon his transfer, he ‘... discovered that he was the only officer in the War College Division who had any training or experience in what we now designate as military intelligence (Van Deman, 1950, 31) <sup>[49]</sup>.’ Van Deman’s efforts to re-establish a functional military information division, prior to the US government’s entry into the First World War were not successful. With the US government’s entry into the war, Van Deman approached the Chief of Staff of the US Army and was not only told that there was no reason for establishing an American military information service, as necessary information could be obtained from allied forces, but was also ordered to not broach the topic with Secretary of War (Van Deman, 1950, 33-34) <sup>[49]</sup>. Van Deman, through a pair of contacts, was able to secure a meeting with Secretary of War, Newton Baker, and his lobbying efforts proved successful.

On 3 May, 1917, the Military Information Committee was replaced, with Van Deman as the head, by the War College Division’s Military Intelligence Section (Finley, 1995, 80; Finnegan, 1998, 22) <sup>[15, 16]</sup>. Van Deman noted that the organization was based upon a British structure ‘... and for that reason our organization was named military intelligence instead of the former name of military information (Van Deman, 1950, 37) <sup>[49]</sup>.’ Van Deman worked in close concert with Colonel Claude Dansey of the British Security Services and was provided with written materials regarding the structure and methods of intelligence organization (Finley, 1995, 80) <sup>[15]</sup>. The Military Intelligence Section became the

Military Intelligence Branch of the Executive Division, which was created by the General Staff reorganization of 9 February, 1918 and subsequently became the Military Intelligence Division following a second reorganization of the General Staff later in the same year (United States Department of War, 1919, 285)<sup>[44]</sup>. At the national level, the coordination of the intelligence effort was conducted by means of ‘... weekly conferences held at the Department of Justice and attended by representatives of these departments (State, Navy, Justice and War) who consider matters of common interest (United States Department of War, 1918, 5)<sup>[43]</sup>.’

In the field, General John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) organized his staff, along the lines of the French, with four main sections consisting of personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics, with section corresponding to a numerical value (1-4, respectively) and preceded by the British letter G for General Staff (Finley, 1995, 82; Bigelow, 2012)<sup>[4, 15]</sup>. The numerical designation eventually became standard for all AEF units (Bigelow, 2012)<sup>[4]</sup>. General Pershing tasked Colonel Dennis Nolan with creating a procedural framework for intelligence operations and after studying both the French and British systems, Nolan decided to adopt the British system (Gilbert, 2012, 68)<sup>[18]</sup>. A greater level of detail regarding the historical developments during this timeframe can be found in the cited references and in elsewhere (Stout, 2010)<sup>[35]</sup>. The American experience in the First World War can be temporally correlated, in the least, with a change, as evidenced by the literature, of a view of synonymous usage of the terms information and intelligence. This is detailed and discussed in the final paper of this series. Herein, it is sufficient to note intelligence as an organization was again allowed to decline after the terminus of the First World War and thusly continued the extant, of the time and antecedent, paradigm. A second Joint Board, in regards to joint planning and operations, was established in 1919 but also failed secondary to lacking any legal authority (Joint Chiefs of Staff, n. d.).

During the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, prior to the onset of armed hostilities involving the US government within the context of the Second World War, a number of change were made to intelligence as an organization. On 5 June, 1940, representative from the Military Intelligence Division (MID), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reached an agreement, known as the Delimitation Agreement, regarding the coverage of scope of the espionage, counterespionage and sabotage that would be handled by each agency; this was followed by the 24 June, 1940 agency assignment, by Roosevelt, in regards to foreign intelligence (Benson, 1987, 1)<sup>[1]</sup>. One month later (July of 1940), Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, made a suggestion to Roosevelt that a representative (by his suggestion, William J. Donovan) should be sent to England in order to study the propaganda efforts of the German government. Donovan's acceptance followed by a subsequent overseas trip predicated his response, at Roosevelt's request, in a 10 June 1941 memorandum detailing suggestions for a program for psychological warfare and intelligence organization (History Project, 1976, 5-8). On 11 July, 1941, Roosevelt issued a Presidential directive establishing the position of Coordinator of Information (COI), with Donovan as the head, and ‘with authority to collect and analyze all

information, and data, which may bear on national security; to correlate such information and date, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine ... (United States National Archives, 1941, 3422-3423)<sup>[45]</sup>.’ This did not alter the ad hoc nature of the intelligence endeavor under the Executive branch, and nor did it prevent the occurrence of the intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt, on 13 June, 1942, dissolved the COI and split its responsibilities in twain with respect to two new agencies: the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Jointness, in regards the Departments of War and the Navy, was returned to the fore following the entry of the US government, into the Second World War, as a declared combatant. A conference, under the codename ARCADIA, between American and British officials, that ran from 26 December, 1941 to 14 January, 1942, saw the British joint effort represented via the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), but with no corresponding American counterpart; while with no official charter (until after the war), the British CCS concept served as the impetus for the creation of what would become to be known, initially in function, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (Cate, 1983, 253-254)<sup>[7]</sup>. In December, 1944 the Secretaries of the State, War and Navy Departments created the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to provide ‘a much-needed working linking between the military and those responsible for foreign policy (Mosley *et al.*, 1945)<sup>[26]</sup>.’

The settlement achieved at the terminus of the Second World War, in regards to intelligence as an organization, within the American context, represented a paradigm shift. Shortly before the terminus of the Second World War, Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, was commissioned to conduct a study on an appropriate postwar organizational structure for the US military, given the success of the coordination between the Army and Navy during the war (Walsh, 1945, iii-iv)<sup>[51]</sup>. On 19 June, 1945, Forrestal commissioned Ferdinand Eberstadt in regards to providing recommendations on three questions (Forrestal, 1945)<sup>[17]</sup>. The three questions, paraphrased, were (1) would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve national security; (2) if the answer to the first question was negative, then what changes, based upon the experience in the Second World War, would be desirable to improve national security; (3) what form of postwar organization regarding the military and other government departments and agencies would be advisable for the most effective provision and protection of national security. Eberstadt's response was preceded by President Truman's decision, on 20 September, 1945, to dissolve the OSS and transfer its functions to the newly created Interim Research and Intelligence Service, within the Department of State, and to the Department of War, which gained the function of the Strategic Service Unit and the Psychological Warfare Division (Truman, 1945)<sup>[36]</sup>. Eberstadt's response, on 25 September, 1945, included, but was not limited to, the following recommendations: organization of the military into three departments (War, Navy and Air); creation of a policy making and advisory body, charged with formulating and coordinating policy in regards to the areas of politics and the military, termed the National Security Council (NSC); formalizing the authority and responsibilities of the JCS, by statute; the creation of a central intelligence agency,

that while not responsible for collection, would be responsible for the coordination of 'compilation, analysis, evaluation and dissemination' of all collected information (Eberstadt, 1945)<sup>[14]</sup>.

On 22 January, 1946, by Presidential directive, Truman established the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and its operational arm, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and under the advisement of the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) (United States National Archives, 1946, 1337, 1339)<sup>[46]</sup>. In the directive, it was noted that the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, together with a representative named by Truman, were to comprise the NIA. Each of the three departments was 'from time to time assign persons and facilities,' the resulting personnel of which would constitute the CIG. Four tasks were assigned to the DCI and included 'the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence...' and to 'plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies in your Departments as to relate to the national security...' On 8 February, 1946, the NIA issued its first directive, which tasked the CIG to '... furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War and Navy Departments, and as appropriate, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other governmental departments and agencies having strategic and policy functions related to the national security (National Intelligence Authority, 1946).' The CIG was the immediate predecessor to the CIA (Warner, 1996)<sup>[52]</sup>.

Based upon the previous presentation, one may see that the contention of intelligence as organization and activity, with military roots, in regards to the US, was a defensible and defended proposition. Furthermore, two of three staffing elements of the CIG were from the two military departments that were extant at the time. Following the theme of the military roots of US intelligence, it should not be a surprising fact that the first DCI, Sidney Souers, appointed on 22 January, 1946, as the interim DCI, was previously a Rear Admiral in the US Navy and the Deputy Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

## Discussion

The concept of intelligence, as an organization, in the American context, evolving within a military setting quite befits the historical record. In the examples covered in the body of this work, specifically inclusive of the details presented, the views attributed to Sun Tzu are most apt given that they detail intelligence, as an organization, provide this detail in specificity to the actions of kings and generals and due to Sun Tzu's serving as a general in the army of King Helü of the state of Wu. One readily could have used the example of King Hammurabi in regards to a translation of clay tablet of a correspondence to Zimri-Lim in which the indication was made that, 'I will not send (troops) as long as I do not have information concerning the enemy (Sheldon, 1989)<sup>[33]</sup>.' Such an example, however, makes no mention of intelligence, as an organization. Clearly, though, extending from antiquity, one would have a reasonable expectation that some form of organization, in regards to intelligence, would have to have been operative in the field. Information that could be obtained by simple human observation, even without any technological

enhancement, arising from scouting and reconnaissance, when accurate and efficiently processed, would certainly have aided in the deployment of one's own assets and reduced the potential for being surprised by the opposition. One can readily cite a litany of examples from the historical record, extending into modernity, that support the validity of this statement. One such example, showing by counterpoint, is the case of the outcome of the June, 1876 Battle of Little Bighorn, in which the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the US Army was defeated by a combined force of combatants deriving from the Lakota, Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes. While an organization was present for scouting and reconnaissance, the inadequate conduction of the latter (Donovan, 2008, 66)<sup>[13]</sup> resulted in a number of decisions on the part of General George A. Custer, which in turn led to the aforementioned outcome. This example serves a second role in that the date falls between that of the disbanding of the American Civil War era Bureau of Military Intelligence and the subsequent creation of the Division of Military Information.

While one is not making the argument that the outcome of the Battle of Little Bighorn would have differed had the Division of Military Information been established, in the same form as it was established in 1885, prior to June of 1876, the example of battle aids in providing an example for differentiating the hierarchical and therefore operational levels at issue. The paradigm of an increase in organizational capacity associated with intelligence followed by its diminution was one that was predominately apt for what in modernity maps to a strategic level of command. This disaggregation holds even when one considers the case of George Washington, who not only was the 'spymaster' but was also a general that commanded troops in the field. An individual can map to differing roles, within an organizational hierarchy, at differing points in time as well as simultaneously. It should be clear that the suggestion is not being made that the structure of intelligence, as an organization, at the field level, is time invariant. Intelligence, as an organization, is different that the potential utility of the information that can be obtained by such an organization.

While one may question the necessity for the inclusion of the history of the issues arising from the perception of jointness in regards to the US ground and naval forces, such a presentation was necessary. This is apt for the following reasons. Firstly, the history of the development of intelligence, as an organization, in the US, was one that was intrinsically entrenched in the history of the US military. Secondly, the US Army and US Navy (and later the US Air Force) represented separate 'smokestacks' in the US military hierarchy. This holds true not only for historical development of each organization but also at later points in time. The formalization of the JCS structure by the National Security Act of 1947 did not translate, into permanency, the perceived success that arose in regards to joint planning and operations as per the Second World War experience. The passage, in 1986, of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was predicated upon the perception of deficiencies in jointness between the military branches. The discussion of such issues continue into extant time (Cozad *et al.*, 2023)<sup>[9]</sup>. The historical ensconcing of intelligence, as an organization, within the military coupled with the 'smokestack' organizational hierarchy not only was clearly reflected with the introduction of the CIG (and later the CIA) and

continues into extant time. Thirdly, one can readily state that the potential for success in joint planning and operations, in a context involving multiple departments, is predicated, in part, upon a common understanding of terminology. Such a common understanding aids in the efficient segregation of effort and in limiting duplicative effort. One can readily make the same argument when considering a single department with multiple divisions and even in the simple case of a communicative process involving two individuals. The issue of organizational structure did not manifest itself solely within the context of joint planning and operations but also manifested itself in the organizational structure of the US Army. In this regard, the interactions with and observations of the Continental militaries was key, during the later half of the 19th century, when it came to the professionalization of military training in the US. This experience was also key to the early 20th century establishment of the General Staff Corps. The importance of the interaction with the Continental militaries, specifically the British and French, can readily be seen in regards to the First World War. One should remember that the combat ready divisions of the AEF, initially, operated under British and French command. Gaining combat experience, in regards to the peculiarities of the European theater (e.g. trench warfare), under foreign command, was important. However, even more important, in the view of the subject author, was the provision of the opportunity afforded to both Pershing and Nolan, for studying and adopting from both the British and French military organizational structures. Inclusive of this was the development of intelligence, as a key organizational component, at both the strategic and operational levels. Another key aspect of the First World War experience, as it related to intelligence as content, process and organization, was the widescale use of technology. Some of this technology, such as the hot air balloon (invented in France in the late 18th century), the electrical telegraph (invented by Francis Ronalds in 1816) and the photographic camera (the first permanent image being attributed to Nicéphore Niépce in 1826) were not novel and had been utilized, in the American Experience, during the American Civil War. Fixed-wing, heavier than air, engine powered aircraft, on the other hand, were novel. The employment of such technology, over previous methods, was clearly advantageous, but required the development of personnel, within the employing force, with specialized capacity. This included, but is not limited to, generally, the capacity for modality-specific collection and interpretation, and specifically, in regards to signals, the capacity for masking one's own transmissions, the capacity for intercepting the opponent's transmissions and the capacity for decoding such transmissions if necessary. The use of coded messages and ciphers were clearly not novel given that both date to ancient Egyptian times, in regards to intelligence. However, the benefits that could be obtained by use of technology such as the telegraph, resulting in the employment of such technology, resulted in an increased level of importance in both protecting one's own transmitted information as well in obtaining and deciphering that of the opposition.

A final point is worthy of further discussion. This point relates to the paradigm change that occurred with the terminus of the Second World War in regards to the diminution of intelligence, as an organization, at the strategic level. On a preliminary basis, one may posit that

the post-war settlement served as a driver for this change. While the term 'isolationist' is often used to characterize the foreign policy of a number of administrations prior to the First World War and for the post-Wilson period between the two World Wars, such a characterization is only apt when compared to the post-Second World War settlement. Examples the belie the isolationist characterization include, but are not limited to, continental, contiguous, territorial expansion and the concomitant defeat and pacification of the American Indian tribes (the Apache Wars terminated in 1924), the aforementioned Spanish-American War, the resultant of which turned the US into a colonial power as a result of acquiring the Spanish holdings of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, the Mexican-American War, the conflict that arose from President Wilson's interference in the internal politics of Mexico and the decidedly anti-isolationist view ensconced within the Monroe Doctrine. In regards to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the US was the only industrialized country that emerged with an intact industrial base. The extent for the capacity for foreign interventionism that this settlement allowed for, presaged by events such as the 1944 Breton Woods Agreement, which set the stage for the later establishment of the US dollar as the global reserve currency, was limited only to the extent of resistance by the governments of the Soviet Union and allied states<sup>[8]</sup>. In the view of the subject author, the ability to exploit the opportunity presented by the terminus of the Second World War was predicated upon the development of capacity and capability. The diminution of intelligence, as an organization, would have been antithetical for such a predication. One could also consider the reality that the end of the Second World War was merely a transition point with the opposition to the US government changing from the Axis Powers to the Soviet Bloc and the metaphorical temperature of the war changing from hot to cold. One could thusly argue that the events since the start of the Second World War, inclusive, as they relate to intelligence as an organization, in the US, are simply contiguous and without a resultant perceived period of peace, as was the case, repeatedly, with the antecedent paradigm.

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- term with multiple definitions represents a case where the mapping is one-to-many. The term monosemy, in context, refers to terms with a singular meaning.
4. One may readily discuss the translation on a prima facie basis and irrespective of its accuracy.
  5. An alternative date for consideration would be 3 September, 1783, which is the date of signing of the Treaty of Paris.
  6. This terminology is purposefully chosen. '
  7. The calculation uses a start date of 7400 BCE, coinciding approximately with the advent of the first Neolithic cultures, in Mesopotamia, that can reasonably be termed as civilizations.
  8. The tangential rabbit hole of the globalization of views of a small but very well-placed, in regards to levers of power, cabal, resulting in the forcing of their own weltanschauung, onto others is not followed herein.

### End Notes

1. Objectivistic and subjectivistic are not used, in this work, as adjectival references to objective and subjective, respectively. The former refers to physical reality, while the latter refers to mental abstraction (exclusive of the neurons and the electrical and chemical processes by which such abstractions are encoded).
2. One may also dispense with the dogmatic claim that reality is 'socially constructed.' Objectivistic actuality, to varying degrees of accuracy, is described through the use of language. No amount of licking oneself clean using one's own tongue and defecating in a litterbox will, as if by sorcery, turn one into a cat (and even if one resorts to calling oneself a cat). Curiously enough, the author has yet to find an adherent of the nontheistic religion in question that is willing to test his or her faith in the crucible of the gravity challenge.
3. In mathematics, a function that maps each element of a domain to at most one element of a codomain (i.e. a one-to-one mapping) is an injective mapping. A single