**Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations, after the war of the 90s**

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**Abstract**

The purpose of the research work is to analyze Abkhazian-Georgian and Ossetian-Georgian relations after the 90s war, what Georgia did to settle the conflict and what could be done to settle the conflict. The article is unique in the sense that it presents the ways to resolve the conflict, we have consistently presented the steps that are required of Georgia as one of the parties to the conflict to resolve the conflict.

The article analyzes in depth the mistakes that prevented the resolution of the conflict after the war of the 90s. Without bias, we will review the tragic war of the 90s in the history of Georgia. Along with everything, we tried to depict the moods and attitudes of the Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers towards Georgia after the battles. Today, the Georgian print space suffers from a lack of coverage of similar issues, which is wrong in our opinion, and when we want to settle the conflict, we must clearly see the mistakes made by all three parties that led them to the conflict. Actually, the conflict could have been resolved at the time through constant dialogue and communication.

The article will be of great help to the Georgian government to resolve the conflict and regulate relations with the fraternal Abkhazians and Ossetians.

**Keywords:** Normalization of relations with Abkhazians and Ossetians through active communication

**Introduction**

When we want peace with our brothers Abkhazians and Ossetians, we must first deeply analyze what mistakes were made by all three parties during relations with each other. The goal of our state is to pursue a peaceful policy with our brothers Abkhazians and Ossetians, especially since in the historical past we had a long experience of peaceful coexistence, Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian families were formed, even this fact shows how close we were to each other and how we shared common happiness and worry.

Today Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians have great alienation in their relations. Currently, there is a big gap between us because of the war that has brought only pain, sorrow and endless tears. It is clear that this war did not have a winner because the loss of brotherhood is the greatest tragedy. Currently, communication between Georgia with Abkhazians and Ossetians is not so active that it is possible to solve the conflict through dialogue, although this is not our country's fault, external factors play a big role here, including our neighboring huge state Russia. In our opinion, apart from Abkhazia and Ossetia, it is necessary for Georgia to conduct an active dialogue with Russia and to convince the neighboring country that stability and peace in the Caucasus will be beneficial for it as well.

We must analyze how Georgians' dialogue, meetings with Abkhazians and Ossetians went and highlight the mistakes made by Georgia and our brother, Abkhazians and Ossetians, in order to set a goal on how to resolve and regulate the conflict.

While working on the article, we actively used the material available in the online space because nowadays we have a dearth of literary information on Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations after the war of the 90s. The information extracted from various web-portals helped us a lot to present Georgia's relations with the brotherly Abkhazians and Ossetians after the war, and based on this, we presented a very interesting and objective article, which will cause great interest among readers. Our goal is peace with the aforementioned brotherly peoples of the Caucasus for this purpose, we studied in detail the steps taken by Georgia after the war of the 90s.

While researching the issue, we discovered that there were big mistakes were made by
Georgia to resolve the conflict peacefully, and this was caused by the rigid positions of the ruling government of Georgia at that time towards the Abkhazians and Ossetians. In fact, many opportunities, odds to resolve the conflict peacefully was not used properly the previous rulers of Georgia, government had not developed an effective plan that would be result-oriented, how to regain the lost territories. Georgia had to earn trust of the Abkhazians and Ossetians through meetings. In our opinion, in order for Georgia to regulate relations with Abkhaz and Ossetians, it is necessary to have constant communication and dialogue with them, otherwise the issue will remain unresolved and frozen.

As the author of the article, I tried to reflect as objectively as possible in the article everything that happened after the battles and how Georgia tried to regulate the conflict with the neighboring Abkhazians and Ossetians. Our goal is to give the reader a clear idea of what mistakes Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians have made during their relations with each other.

We consider peaceful policy towards our brothers Abkhazians and Ossetians as a way to settle the conflict. After the 1992 war with the Ossetians and the 1993 war with the Abkhazians, the economic and political crisis in our country in the 1990s, Georgia aspired to regulate relations with them peacefully, through dialogue. Negotiations with Ossetians and Abkhazians began from this period, which unfortunately ended without results and the conflict could not be resolved.

The meeting of Georgian and Russian political leaders, Eduard Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin in the city of Sochi on June 24, 1992 was a positive step in the settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, where an agreement was signed on the principles of arrangement the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. The parties shared their positions and declared that the conflict would not be subjected to escalation, opposing warriors did not open fire on each other and would facilitate the peaceful return of Georgian IDPs in Abkhazia.

The de facto Republic of South Ossetia, since then Georgian-Ossetian relations have stagnated. Tensions with Ossetians eventually culminated in war. On August 7, 2008, hostilities began between Georgian and Ossetian troops, and Russia joined the war on August 8. Russians helped Ossetians with military units and fought Georgians for 3 days. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Russian ships blocked Georgia’s Black Sea coast. Russia was not satisfied with the front opened near Tskhinvali and opened a second front near the Kodori Gorge, from where they invaded the internal territories of Western Georgia, and Georgian troops left Abkhazia and Tskhinvali after 5 days. It should be noted that if it were not for the active action of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the August 12 cease-fire agreement, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was ready to fully occupy Georgia, although he had already ordered a cease-fire on August 12 but the presence of Russian soldiers in Georgia and the bombing of populated areas continued intensively. The country was facing a disaster. After the signing of the agreement, Russia withdrew a large part of its army from Samegrelo and Shida Kartli. On August 26, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to the information of the government of Georgia as of September 25, 2008, 168 servicemen of the armed forces, 16 police officers, and 188 civilians died during the war.

On December 1, 1992, a meeting was held in Geneva, where the Georgian and Abkhazian parties signed a memorandum of understanding, the parties agreed that they would not use military forces also they would exchange prisoners and Georgian refugees would also return safely in Abkhazia. On April 4, 1994, under the auspices of the United Nations, Sukhumi and Tbilisi again discussed the issue of IDPs and agreed that the IDPs would return to their homes, and also discussed that Abkhazia would have its own constitution and state symbols. On May 14, 1994, a ceasefire was signed in Moscow and it was planned to introduce CIS peacekeepers into the conflict zone, but only Russia among the CIS members was willing to allocate troops to ensure peace. The Georgian side expressed mistrust towards Russia and it was unacceptable to transform the Armenian battalion named after Marshal Bagramian into a peacekeeping force. The destructive actions of the Georgian armed groups White
Legion and Forest Brothers, who did not obey the Georgian authorities, prevented the settlement of the conflict [5]. [https://geaconflict.jam-news.ge/qartul-afkhazuri-samshvidobopolitikis-mimokhi1va-omidan-dghemde/]

Georgian IDPs wanted to return to their homes, and the Georgian government always promised them to return to Abkhazia, but it was clear that if Abkhazia did not have the prerequisites and willingness to return the displaced people to their native land and water, only Georgia could not do anything unilaterally. Many people died with the dream of returning to Abkhazia one day, the governments of different times gave them hope for this, but in reality it did not happen. There were also those IDPs who objectively perceived the reality and knew that in order to end the conflict, constant communication of the parties was necessary and clear actions were needed to really that the Georgians would return to Abkhazia.

The year 1995 was remarkable in that Abkhazia and Georgia signed a protocol of conflict resolution, according to which both sides agreed on the formation of a single federal state and the distribution of power, although the Abkhazians later withdrew their signature, and the following year, the Council of Commanders of the CIS in Sukhumi and imposed military sanctions.

https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%98-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%9E%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9C%E1%83%98%E1%83%A4%E1%83%9D-%E1%83%90%E1%83%A4%E1%83%9D%E1%83%90%E1%83%96%E1%83%9E%E1%83%91%E1%83%97%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C-%E1%83%A0%E1%83%90%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1%83%90%E1%83%9E%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9C%E1%83%98%E1%83%A4%E1%83%9D-%E1%83%90%E1%83%96%E1%83%9E%E1%83%91%E1%83%97%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C-

In 1997, Tbilisi and Sukhumi developed various measures to resolve the conflict with the intransigence of Russia and the involvement of the United Nations. According to the newly developed project, the concept of a common state arose around the idea of a unified state, which turned out to be unpopular due to its unspecified meaning for Tbilisi. At the same time, the Georgian side did not like that according to the project, Abkhazia kept its constitution. This conflict resolution project failed.

Due to the disagreement between the parties, on August 14, 1997, Vladislav Ardzinba, the de facto president of Abkhazia, and Eduard Shevardnadze met in Tbilisi. This meeting did not play a decisive role in settling the conflict, the parties only expressed their readiness to protect peace and for this it was necessary to continue the dialogue. The discussion lasted for 9 hours. Vladislav Ardzinba stated that the confrontation between Georgia and Abkhazia should be ended and it was necessary to find a common language, to maintain and continue the correct communication. The opposing parties agreed that the conflict would not be renewed and bloodshed would not be allowed. A document was signed stating that hostilities would not start between official Tbilisi and Sukhumi. Eduard Shevardnadze stated at the briefing that the signing of the peace document was the basis for the reconciliation of the Georgian and Abkhazian people. According to Ardzinba, it was necessary to restore the lost trust between Georgians and Abkhazians. He stated that it was possible to find the key to all problems with joint efforts and was also discussed the issue of returning IDPs to Abkhazia. After these meetings, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that Russia's goal was peace and stability in South Caucasus. The tense background in the region had to be eased and the conflict could actually be settled by continuing the meetings of the opposing parties. US President Bill Clinton, in a letter sent for Eduard Shevardnadze, he considered positively meeting Shevardnadze with Ardzinba and he urged them to continue the meetings. Russia's involvement in resolving the issue of the territorial integrity of Georgia.

It seems that settling the conflict in a peaceful way was indeed possible. Many people would return to their native land, if all three parties actually agreed on this issue. Warming of relations created opportunities for Georgia to return its territories in such a way that the Abkhazians were also satisfied, Russians claimed that they would facilitate the peaceful return of Georgian refugees in Abkhazia.

At the meeting on August 14, 1997, it was decided that high-level meetings between the Georgian-Abkhazian parties would be held in Geneva and Russians will take part there. OSCE would attend it, the countries of the Group of Friends were observers, represented by such countries as: France, Germany, the Russian Federation, England and the United States of America. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on a number of issues, that it was necessary to create a coordination council, where they would work on social and economic problems, non-admission of war, and the issues of IDPs. After a long period of time, the parties were supposed to meet to discuss the achievements of the dialogue. In the spring of 1998, the clash between Georgian partisans and Abkhazians in the Gali region prevented the escalation of the conflict. In addition to the fact that a lot of
people died during this battle, many people became refugees due to the events that took place. It was the culmination of the escalation of Georgian-Abkhazian relations. In 1999, the Abkhazians adopted the "Independence Act", which complicated the dialogue between the parties. [https://geabconflict.jam-news.net/ge/gartul-afkhazuri-samshvidobo-politikis-mimokhi/la-omidan-dghemde]

In September 2002, Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelaev's agreed entry with Georgian forces into the Kodori valley had a negative impact on the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Gelaev's raid cost the lives of many people [9], [https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/1523422.html]

In our opinion, the Georgian security agencies should have been careful and should to prevent Gelaev invasion in Kodori valley. All this led to the loss of trust in Georgians on the part of Abkhaz. Dieter Boden, special representative of the UN Secretary General in Georgia, created the document without the participation of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. The drawn up document was the key to resolving the conflict with the Abkhazians. Boden's document consisted of paragraphs. According to one such point, Georgia represented a sovereign state, its territorial borders had to be protected. According to one of the points, Abkhazia would be a sovereign entity within the state of Georgia, which would have a special status, it would be based on federal agreement. None of the opposite parties accepted the Boden document offered to them. [https://netgazeti.ge/south_caucasus/147921/]

2004 There was a change of government in Georgia. The second president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, was always associated with war and destruction for the Abkhazians, and was a personally unacceptable person. Despite the moonlighting in Georgia, the Abkhazians were not ready for negotiations. Abkhazians themselves were also preparing for the presidential elections. At first, the new government of Georgia tried to regain the trust of the Abkhazians, for example, the appointment of Goga Khaindrava as the state minister for conflict resolution was acceptable to the Abkhazians. In the eastern part of Abkhazia, partisan Georgian groups have been arrested. On May 26, 2004, the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, addressed the Abkhazians and Ossetians in their native language and urged them to engage in negotiations. Saakashvili then announced that the conflict with the Abkhazians and Ossetians should should have been resolved peacefully.

In April 2004, with the support of the United Nations, the parties held meetings in Tbilisi and Geneva, discussing the return of IDPs to Gali region [11]. [https://civil.ge/ka/archives/134728]

2005 The defacto president of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, was replaced by Sergey Bagapsh, who at first was friendly towards Georgians, and there were expectations that Bagapsh would facilitate the return of IDPs to Abkhazia. At that time, the President of Georgia appointed Irakli Alasania as his personal representative in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict settlement issue, [https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/1539721.html]

Goga Khaindrava and Irakli Alasania enjoyed great authority in the Abkhazian elite, who took the lead in the Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations. Official Tbilisi believed that with the change of government in Abkhazia and the measures taken by them, they would finally settle the dispute with Abkhazia, but they could not take into account the fact that in reality Abkhazia was politically ruled by Russia and without his will, the conflict could not be resolved.

In 2005, a meeting between Abkhazia's de facto foreign minister Sergey Shamba and Goga Khaindrava took place. The parties signed a document according to which they remain faithful to the 1994 Moscow Agreement, hostilities would not resume and there would be stability in the region. The parties agreed that additional meetings would be held and active communication would continue. The next meeting is very important it was prevented by the political crisis in the Georgian government. The government of Georgia was divided into two banks where the Minister of Defense Irakli Okruashvili and the Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili held one position. They supported the central government's rigid policy towards Abkhazia. Goga Khandrava and Irakli Alasania disagreed with them and supported the peaceful policy of conflict settlement. The attitude of the Georgian government towards them was confusing for Abkhazians, due to which they continued to lose confidence in Georgians. The rigid policy of the representatives of the Georgian government towards them was like pouring oil on the fire and made it difficult to settle the conflict peacefully. The Russian Federation took great advantage of the created heavy background.

On July 31, 2005, another Georgian-Abkhaz meeting was held in Vienna. During the negotiations, representatives of both Georgia and Abkhazia agreed to begin talks on the creation of a confederation, but the third president of Georgia unexpectedly refused to do so. [http://www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=12578 &lang=Ge]

Saakashvili already clearly supported the implementation of a rigid policy towards the Abkhazians, which made dialogue difficult and reduced the chances of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The rigid approach of the central government of Georgia to the Abkhazians prevented the main goal of making the Abkhazians trust the Georgians. We can freely say that the Georgian side, due to its stubbornness, lost the opportunity to settle the conflict in real time and to return the IDPs to their native lands and waters. Pursuing a rigid policy towards the Abkhazians was self-indulgence with its own muscles, and it is quite natural that in this way Georgia would go to war and not to settlement of the conflict.

Along with everything, we must say that the Abkhazians came to compromise on a number of issues, but the Georgian side stubbornly stood on its positions, and this indicated that Georgia did not have a clear peace plan for the Abkhazians.

During this period, the peace policy of the Georgian side towards the Abkhazians was not observed, due to which they lost confidence in the Georgians. One day, the government of our country sent messages that the conflict would be resolved peacefully, and the next day, Abkhazians heard the statements of Georgian Ministers Vano Merabishvili and Irakli Okruashvili that the Georgian government should have a stricter policy towards Abkhazians.

The 2006 meeting between Irakli Alasania and Sergey Bagapsh in Sukhumi is considered a great achievement in the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The parties agreed that they would not use military force in the future, the IDPs would return, the Coordination Council...

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would be restored, and the parties would actively engage in dialogue. https://civil.ge/ka/archives/143533

Sergey Bagapshi was interested in regulating relations with Georgia war, the conflict, should be a thing of the past. Abkhazians and Georgians had to sit, he enjoyed great authority in Abkhazia, and his word had enough weight there, as if the tart new relations from a clean sheet, there was readiness for this in the Georgian and Abkhazian society, even the IDPs believed that they would definitely return to their native land and water, but this was only expectations, and in reality the conflict was not resolved. The Abkhazians lost more and more trust in the Georgians, due to the wavering policy of the Georgian government towards them, i.e. if one day there were messages from the Georgian government that the conflict would be settled peacefully, the next day they heard Vano Merabishvili’s Irakli Okruashvili’s statements that Georgia should pursue a more rigid policy towards the Abkhazians.

On May 15, 2006, the first session of the Coordination Council was held in Tbilisi. Sergey Shamba presented the peace plan “The key to the future”. The goal of the plan was the final settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and the settlement of good neighborly relations. According to the ship, first of all, Georgia should have apologized to Abkhazia, after the simulation, because of the state policy of war and isolation. This should be followed by the lifting of the economic blockade with the Abkhazians, the signing of a peace treaty and the integration of Fakhazeti into the economic projects of the Black Sea region. https://www.radioavisupleba.ge/a/1546997.htm

As we can see, Georgia had to apologize to Abkhazia for the war, although in these battles not only Abkhazia was affected, but also Georgia, because both sides had human losses, as far as assimilation policy is concerned, Georgia has always been a tolerant country, and in the historical past, there is no record of any fact of assimilation of Abkhazians, anything like that. It has never happened in the history of Georgia, and if it had happened, the Abkhazians as representatives of an ethnic group could not reach this time, on the contrary, Georgia always helped to strengthen the identity of the Abkhazians and tried to have fraternal relations with them, and the Abkhazians, despite the goodwill of the Georgians, stubbornly sought to separate from Georgia.

As for the war between Georgians and Abkhazians, the fact is that both sides were guilty because they did nothing to prevent the conflict and got involved in hostilities. Abkhazians isolated themselves, closed the borders. Today, the international community does not recognize the separatist republic of Abkhazia as in the past, and they consider this corner to be a historical, indivisible part of Georgia. Objectivity is required, we believe that the economy of Abkhazia experienced a great upswing when it was a part of Georgia.

During Sergei Shamba’s visit to Tbilisi, there were expectations in Georgian society that Shamba would meet with Saakashvili, but instead of the meeting, he went to Senaki to visit the military base. https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/177477-24082011/

It is clear that the Abkhazian side was not surprised by such an action of the president and they lost confidence in the Georgians. It seems that Saakashvili did not want to resolve the conflict peacefully, when the preconditions for this already existed, he is taking the wrong steps. He should have used every chance and in order to settle the conflict, he would have stayed in Tbilisi and met Sergey Shamba. In the end, Georgia did not use the favorable situation to improve relations with the Abkhazians, and on the contrary, it distanced itself more and more from Abkhazia with rigid positions.

Along with the deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations, Mikhail Saakashvili broke up the Khaindrava-Alasania team and the third president assigned Goga Khaindrava to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Meran Antadze, whose actions did not lead to major changes in the aspect of conflict resolution, which affected Irakli Alasania, the Georgian ambassador to the United Nations. appointed As Giorgi Khaindrava mentioned, his dismissal was connected with his criticism of the government, Irakli Okruashvili opposed him in his statements because Khaindrava did not support the fact of the arrest of Russian officials by the Georgian military police in the conflict zone of July 14 and 15, 2006.

Khaindrava was interested in ending the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in a peaceful way, not by arrests, by artificially escalating the conflict. Giorgi Khaindrava enjoyed great authority among the officials of Abkhazia and everyone respected him, as evidenced by the fact that The Abkhaz side always came to the dialogue, where Khaindrava and Irakli Alasania were involved. Giorgi Khaindrava openly criticized Okruashvili and called his actions dangerous for Georgia. The de facto government of Tskhinvali was also worried about Khaindrava’s removal, the Ossetians believed that by removing the minister of state, Georgia was choosing the path of confrontation with the Ossetians.

At the conference, Giorgi Khaindrava categorically denied that his removal was a signal for the start of hostilities in the conflict zone and noted that Saakashvili presented only a peaceful way of conflict settlement in the plan. https://civil.ge/ka/archives/138599

In July 2006, the Georgian authorities managed to neutralize the Georgian armed group "Hunter", renamed the Kodori valley and called it Upper Abkhazia, and installed the exiled government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia here. From our point of view, renaming the Kodori Gorge was a mistake, it was not possible to change the name of the historical gorge, with this action Saakashvili gave the Abkhazians a reason to occupy the Kodori Gorge based on the renamed name.

The entry of Georgian military into the Kodori valley was unacceptable for the Abkhazians, and this fact was considered a violation of the 1994 Moscow Treaty, and that is why Sukhumi refused to continue the meetings under the auspices of the United Nations, and the legitimate government of Abkhazia had to leave the Kodori valley immediately.

As we have seen, the Georgian side did not show foresight and their mistakes significantly hindered the process of settling the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict. The former Minister of Defense of Russia, Sergey Ivanov, stated that the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia would be inevitable, due to the occupation of the Kodori Gorge by the Georgians. According to Sergey Bagapshi, the Abkhazians would open fire on the Georgian military if they approached the border controlled by them. https://www.radioavisupleba.ge/a/1547955.html

On March 21, 2008, the Russian Duma made a decision,
nationalism among Georgians, but on the other hand, it
was a threat to its sovereignty, security. Russia
has always been perceived as an enemy of the NATO
military alliance of the North Atlantic countries and has
always criticized them in official statements, while the
Russians warned NATO that the adoption of an action plan
for Georgia and Ukraine to join the North Atlantic Alliance
would significantly strain NATO-Russia relations.

Russia also warned Georgia that in the case of Georgia's
entry into NATO, it would discuss the issue of recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

At the end of March, the third president of Georgia offered
the Abkhazians unlimited autonomy, within Georgia, the
Abkhazians would have an ethnically Abkhazian
representative in the Georgian government, but the
Abkhazians did not accept Saakashvili's offer. Abkhazians
thought that Saakashvili was actually throwing words in the
air and that his populist statements were intended to attract
the attention of the international community. It was
surprising for the Abkhazians how Saakashvili proposed
such a wasteful proposal, when the president did not resort
to any measures to solve the problem, there were no
diplomatic channels. Abkhazians considered Saakashvili's
statements inadequate and evaluated him as an adventurer,
an ambitious person, who spoiled Georgian-Abkhazian
relations with his actions.

On May 12, 2008, at the initiative of US Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, a meeting was held
between Serge Bagapsh and Irakli Alasania, where the
Abkhazian leader expressed his concern about the situation
in the Kodori Valley, the presence of the exiled government
of Abkhazia in their vicinity was unacceptable for the
Abkhazian people, and it seemed to them that in Georgia
According to the decree of the government, units of the
Georgian army were entered into the Kodori valley.
https://civil.ge/ka/archives/143885

On June 23, 2008, when Saakashvili was already trying to
settle relations with Russia, he even sent a letter to Russian
President Dimitri Medvedev. The letter contained
agreements according to which a free economic zone should
be established in the Ochamchire and Gali regions, the
return of IDPs to the conflict zone, the restoration of
Moscow-Thilisi-Yerevan railway traffic through Abkhazia,
and the non-use of military force. The President of Russia
did not accept Saakashvili's proposals, and as for this
he named the need for dialogue with Sukhumi, not with
them. https://netgazeti.ge/news/24416/

In August 2008, the Russia-Georgia war ended with the
agreement on the six-point ceasefire plan of Saakashvili and
Medvedev on August 12. The Russia-Georgia war caused
great political, economic and cultural losses to Georgia.

Finally, to summarize, the key to settling the conflict
and solving the problem is not in the hands of any other country,
but again in the hands of us, Georgians, as we saw, the
reason for the deterioration of Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-Ossetian relations was provoked as a result of less
communication with these people and signs of ethnono-
nationalism. The national movement started against the
Soviet Union, on the one hand, strengthened the feeling of
nationalism among Georgians, but on the other hand, it
made communication with the brotherly Abkhazians and
Ossetians difficult. The collapse of the Soviet Union intensified
their sense of nationalism, like the Georgians, and they wanted to create the so-called independence,
although they failed to determine that by expelling
Georgians from their native territory, by war, they were only
destroying their future, and in fact, the bright future of
Abkhazians and Ossetians was only by living together with
Georgians in these indigenous Georgian territories.

Of course, it is still not too late for the meetings with the
Abkhazians and Ossetians to take place in the format of an
active dialogue and to reach an agreement on such
problematic issues as the return of IDPs, the creation of
economic buffer zones, which will give the opposing parties
the opportunity to take positive steps for reconciliation,
the offer of health services and the operation of a medical post
near the conflict zone. We think close will also play a
positive role in stabilizing relations.

Unfortunately, the previous governments made big mistakes
in relation to the Abkhazians and Ossetians based on their
rigid policy and missed many opportunities to establish
dialogue and effective communication with them. Due to
the wrong policy and great alienation, the trust of these
brotherly peoples towards the Georgians has been lost, and
in this regard, we have an active job as a country to regain
their trust, return to our native corners and live in peace and
brotherhood with the Abkhazians and Ossetians.

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